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The Development of the Social Security Act of
1935: Reflections Some Fifty Years Later
Wilbur J. Cohen*
INTRODUCTION
The Social Security Act of 19351 stands out among the per-
manent contributions of the New Deal2 as landmark legislation.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the Act's historic
significance and future incremental development when he
stated, upon signing the legislation into law on August 14, 1935,
that it "represents a corner stone in a structure which is being
built but is by no means complete."3
The far-reaching law was enacted only fourteen months af-
ter F.D.R. first indicated his general interest on July 8, 1934.
The entire legislative process took only seven months-from
January 17 to August 14, 1935-a remarkable achievement for
such a broad and innovative creation.4 The completed Acts
* Sid W. Richardson Professor of Public Affairs, L.B.J. School of Public
Affairs, University of Texas.
1. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. Among other permanent New Deal programs are the following: Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Securities
Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78kk (1982);
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831dd (1982); Wagner-
Peyser National Employment System Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 49-49n (1976 & Supp. V
1981); National Archives Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2308 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982); Federal Credit Unions
Acts, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795 (1982).
3. Presidential Statement Upon Signing the Social Security Act, 4 PuBUc
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRmcun D. ROOSEVELT 324 (Aug. 14, 1935), re-
printed in READINGS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 101 (W. Haber & W. Cohen eds. 1948).
4. The bill, drafted and recommended by the Committee on Economic Se-
curity and the President, was introduced on January 17, 1935. See H.R. 4120 &
H.R. 4142, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 79 CONG. REc. 626 (1935); S. 1130, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess., 79 CONG. REc. 549 (1935). The proposed bill consisted of nine titles and is
referred to in this Article as "the bill."
5. There are several excellent books which deal with the history of the
1935 Act: A. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY (1966); C.
McKINLEY & R. FRASE, LAUNCHING SOCIAL SECURrrY: A CAPTURE-AND-RECORD
AccouNT, 1935-37 (1970) (foreword by W. Cohen); E. WITrE, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE SOCIAL SECuRrrY ACT (1962) (foreword by F. Perkins, introduction by
W. Cohen and R. Lampman). For Witte's views in 1955, see Witte, Twenty
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consisted of only thirty-two pages; its eleven titles encom-
passed eleven wide-ranging programs emanating from very dif-
ferent sources.6
The largest and most far-reaching program instituted by
the Social Security Act of 1935 is commonly known as "social
security;" its current technical name is the Federal Old Age,
Survivors, Disability and Hospital Insurance program
(OASDHI). Originally entitled the Federal Old Age Benefits
program (OAB), incorporated in Title HI and funded in Title
VIII of the 1935 law,7 the program now is encompassed in Titles
1H (Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance-OASDI) 8 and
XVHI (Medicare) 9 and is funded through the Federal Insur-
ance Contributions Act (FICA).10 The other major social insur-
ance initiative of the 1935 Act was the federal-state
unemployment compensation program; originally consisting of
Title I and Title IX of the 1935 Act," it now is additionally em-
bodied in chapter 23 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA).12 These two ma-
jor programs were considered by its authors to be the social in-
surance aspects of the law, but were officially referred to as
"social insurance" by the Social Security Board and Congress
only after the United States Supreme Court had passed on
their constitutionality.13 The drafters of the legislation deliber-
ately avoided using the term "insurance" in the 1935 law in an
effort to not invite the enmity of conservative members of the
Years of Social Security, Soc. SEcuRT BuLL., Oct. 1955, at 15. See also Soc.
SECURITY BD., SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA: THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE
SOCIAL SECuRnr ACT (1937). One of the first books to appear immediately af-
ter the law's enactment was P. DOUGLAS, SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1936 & 2d ed. 1939).
6. The eleven programs were authorized in nine titles. Two titles dealt
with general matters: Title VII created the Social Security Board and de-
scribed its responsibilities; Title XI defined terms and provided authority for
regulations and separability.
7. Ch. 531, §§ 201, 801-811, 49 Stat. at 622-23, 636-39.
8. Federal Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 401-428 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also Social Security Amendments of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (amending the Social Security Act); Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981) (appropriation
reductions in Social Security programs).
9. Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396n
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
10. The FICA is incorporated in Chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code.
26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3126 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
11. Ch. 531, §§ 301, 904, 49 Stat. at 626, 640-41.
12. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
13. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Da-
vis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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Supreme Court.14
In addition to its social insurance aspects, the Act provided
for three "assistance," or "welfare," programs: Title I, grants to
enable states to provide Old Age Assistance to needy persons
(OAA);15 Title X, grants to states for aid to the needy blind
(AB);16 and Title IV, grants to states for aid to needy depen-
dent children (ADC).17 OAA and AB later were effectively in-
corporated into the Supplemental Security Income program
(SSI), a new and completely separate federal program codified
in subchapter XVI of the revised Act of 1972.18 That incorpora-
tion left ADC (now called Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren-AFDC) to become known and referred to as "the
welfare" program.
The Social Security Act of 1935 also incorporated four
health and medical care programs which have had major signif-
icance in the development of the United States' health policy in
the succeeding fifty years. These programs were the federal Ti-
tle V grants to the states for Maternal and Child Health
(MCH)19 and Crippled Children Services (CCS);20 the perma-
nent authorization of grants to the states for vocational rehabil-
itation (VR),21 first enacted in 1920,22 including medical,
educational, and placement responsibilities; and the federal
grants to the states for Public Health in Title VI.23 The health
and medical care programs were included in the law without
any political controversy, largely due to the American Medical
Association's (AMA) great sense of relief that the Social Secur-
ity Act did not include a provision for state or national health
insurance.24 In order to avoid the "terrible calamity" of com-
14. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
15. Ch. 531, § 2, 49 Stat. at 620-21.
16. Ch. 531, §§ 1001-1006, 49 Stat. at 645-47.
17. Ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. at 627-29.
18. See Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Disability assistance, enacted in
1950, Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 351, 64 Stat. 477, 555,
was incorporated as the third part of the SSI program in 1972, Social Security
Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1329, 1465.
19. Ch. 531, §§ 501-505, 49 Stat. at 629-31.
20. Ch. 531, §§ 511-515, 49 Stat. at 631-33.
21. Ch. 531, § 531, 49 Stat. at 633-34.
22. Act of June 2, 1920, ch. 219, §§ 1-10, 41 Stat. 735 (1920).
23. Ch. 531, §§ 601-603, 49 Stat. at 634-35.
24. The AMA greatly feared that the Social Security Act would include
some type of national health insurance. This fear was illustrated by the AMA's
reaction to the announcement that the research study on the risks to economic
security posed by the Depression, see infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text,
would include consideration of national health insurance:
19831
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pulsory or voluntary state or national health insurance, the
AMA readily accepted for the first time a measure of federal
financial intervention into other aspects of state health and
medical care policy that it had opposed during the 1920s.
The eleventh, and final, program instituted by the Social
Security Act of 1935 was the federal grants to states for Child
Welfare Services (CWS) under Title V.25 This program, admin-
istered by the Children's Bureau, was the first nationwide so-
cial welfare services program of a nonmedical character. It was
subsequently incorporated in Title IV26 which, along with other
types of social services for the aged and other persons, was the
forerunner of Title XX of the 1972 Act and later was enveloped
into the 1981 "Block Grants."27
Clearly, the original law was an omnibus legislative vehicle
which gave a strong push toward an expanded federal role in
social welfare-beyond what F.D.R. and Secretary Perkins en-
visioned in 1934. It served as the basis for what critics would
later call the development of "the welfare state." The wide
range of programs included in the law not only aided aged per-
sons but also children, the blind, and the disabled. The Act
broadened public health services for everyone in the nation,
made vocational rehabilitation services permanent, and in-
creased child welfare services for a wide spectrum of families
from all socioeconomic classes. Although what eventually be-
came the contributory, earnings-related, "Social Security"
(OASDI) program was designed primarily to attract the sup-
port of self-supporting, middle-income persons, the law also be-
came important to some of the poor. Poor families not only
received income and services through the legislation, but for
the first time they received conscious recognition by the federal
government of their existence and plight. Although the Act
As soon as this announcement was made . . . telegraphic protests
poured in upon the President. In the Journal of the American Medical
Association, an editorial was run in which it was stated that the Ad-
ministration, acting through the Committee on Economic Security,
would try to railroad health insurance through Congress, without as
much as consulting the profession, and similar comments were made
in several of the official publications of state medical associations.
E. WirrE, supra note 5, at 174. Thus, the AMA did not seriously object to the
less threatening health programs in the Act. "The American Medical Associa-
tion was far too alarmed about the possibility of health insurance to present
any very serious objection to the administration of the child and maternal
health services through the Children's Bureau." Id. at 167.
25. Ch. 531, § 521, 49 Stat. at 633.
26. See Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 402, 81 Stat. 930-31 (1968).
27. See Social Services Block Grant Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2351-2353, 95
Stat. 867-71 (1981).
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was viewed as a radical program by some conservatives and
viewed as a conservative one by some liberals, many political
figures looked upon it as a middle-of-the-road program
designed to preserve the social and economic structure of the
nation, struggling in the midst of the most severe economic de-
pression the republic had ever encountered. Thus, some indi-
viduals vigorously opposed the program, most others welcomed
it, and others, while critical of some aspects, acknowledged that
it was probably the best compromise available at the time
within the structure of a capitalistic, free market economy and
a democratic, representative legislative system.
With this basic introduction to the Act as background, this
Article traces some of the actions and events important to the
growth of the Social Security Act of 1935. It will discuss impor-
tant actors' roles in the process, identify the many changes be-
tween the initial bill and the Act, examine the development of
the use of the terms "social security" and "insurance," and con-
sider the impact of the challenges to the newly passed Act
presented by the constitutional decisions and the 1936 Republi-
can presidential campaign. The early history of the Social Se-
curity Act helps explain why that specific type of program was
chosen to confront the socioeconomic problems of the time, and
reminds us of the underlying policies that can be considered in
dealing with future approaches to these problems.
I. THE IMPACT OF THE COMMITrEE ON ECONOMIC
SECURITY
Roosevelt and his economic security advisors, Secretary of
Labor Frances Perkins and Federal Emergency Relief Adminis-
trator Harry Hopkins, recognized the strong support in the
1933-34 Congress for federal grants to states for the needy aged
and for some federal legislation in the field of unemployment
compensation.28 The Committee on Economic Security was
created in July 1934 to study methods of providing "security
against the hazards and vicissitudes of life."29 The Commit-
28. The Dill-Connery bill required the federal government to pay one-third
of the cost of state old age assistance. S. 493, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 77 CONG. REc.
413 (1933); HR. 6184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 23 (1934). The bill
passed the House of Representatives and came very near passage in the Sen-
ate. The Wagner-Lewis bill was designed to induce the states to enact state un-
employment compensation laws. HR. 7659, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC.
1978 (1934). For details on the 1934 legislative developments, see E. WrrT=,
supra note 5, at 3-7.
29. H.R. Doc. No. 397, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934) (message of President
Roosevelt).
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tee's primary purpose was to develop a workable social insur-
ance system and it was their proposals and recommendations
that led to introduction of the economic social security bill.30
The Committee's existence resulted in several important
changes and additions to the two pending 1934 bills. First, the
new federal-state programs of OAA, ADC, MCH, CCS, CWS,
and public health grants were added and were to begin opera-
tion in 1936, along with vocational rehabilitation services. Sec-
ond, the old age benefits program was added and had a
tremendous long-range impact.3 1
The Committee on Economic Security also recommended
establishing a Social Insurance Board in the Department of La-
bor which, among other things, would study and make recom-
mendations on health insurance. Specific authorization to
conduct such studies was deleted from the bill by Congress,
but the Social Security Board nevertheless subsequently au-
thorized studies and made far-reaching recommendations
under its authority to deal with "related subjects." 32 This set
the stage for the national health insurance controversies which
have persisted since that time.
Assistant Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Altmeyer, who was
particularly interested in and knowledgeable about health in-
surance, personally sought out one of the leading experts on
health insurance, Edgar Sydenstricker, and arranged for him
and I.S. Falk to direct the Committee's studies on the risks to
economic security posed by ill health. Several members of the
Committee's professional staff became staff members of the So-
cial Security Board, thus aiding in the smooth initial function-
ing of the Board.33 Altmeyer, the Technical Board chairperson,
was appointed a member of the Social Security Board and later
became its chairperson. He was subsequently Commissioner
for Social Security and had a significant, indeed monumental,
30. For a comprehensive examination of the Committee's functions and ac-
tions, see E. WrnTE, supra note 5, at 3-108.
31. See E. WrrrE, supra note 5, at 30-31, 174-76, 178-82, 185-88 (Sydenstrick-
er's role in health aspects of the Act).
32. The Board shall perform the duties imposed upon it by this Act
and shall also have the duty of studying and making recommendations
as to the most effective methods of providing economic security
through social insurance, and as to legislation and matters of adminis-
trative policy concerning old-age pensions, unemployment compensa-
tion, accident compensation, and related subjects.
Ch. 531, § 702, 49 Stat. at 636.
33. They included, among others, I.S. Falk, William R. Williamson, Robert
J. Myers, Merrill G. Murray, Martha D. Ring, Thomas E. Eliot, Murray W. La-
timer, and myself.
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impact on the expansion, policy development, and administra-
tive implementation of the law.34
During formulation of the Committee on Economic Secur-
ity's proposal, it became evident that Emergency Relief Admin-
istrator Hopkins favored some kind of broad, comprehensive,
unified program that would involve, exclusively or substan-
tially, federal general revenues. F.D.R. opposed the idea and
instead strongly favored using payroll taxes to finance both old
age and unemployment compensation. On Treasury Secretary
Morgenthau's recommendation, Congress chose to finance the
old age "insurance" program exclusively from payroll taxes and
interest from the reserves. The President contended that, by
virtue of a statutory "compact" between the contributors and
Congress, financing the program by earmarked payroll taxes
would ensure that a future president and congress could not,
morally or politically, repeal or mutilate the "entitlement" char-
acter of the program.3 5 F.D.R.'s fears were realized in 1981-82
when President Reagan attempted to make sweeping cuts in
social security benefits which were repulsed by Congress.
Roosevelt's safeguards proved to be a powerful but inadequate
weapon, however, as several of Reagan's immediate, albeit rela-
tively minor, cuts were adopted, and some other significant
long-range cuts were legislated for future implementation, un-
dermining the sanctity of the statutory committment.36
It is difficult to ascertain exactly how much the President,
via both the recommendations of the Committee on Economic
Security and his own lobbying, and how much the Congress in-
fluenced the specific policies of the Act in 1934-35. Both played
a significant role. Both the President and the Congress made
important changes in the recommendations of the Committee
on Economic Security. The President, along with Secretary
Morgenthau, clearly influenced the self-supporting financing
scheme of old-age benefits. Aided by the actions of Mississippi
Senator Pat Harrison37 and North Carolina Representative
34. See C. McKnmux & P. FRASE, supra note 5, for the extent of Altmeyer's
contributions. See also A. ALTYER, supra note 5.
35. Secretary Perkins told her side of the story in F. PERKiNs, THE
ROOSEVELT I KNEw 278-301 (1946). For later information on the significant roles
played by Secretary Perkins and others, see G. MARTIN, MADAm SECRETARY:
FRANCES PERIaNs 341-56 (1976).
36. Cohen, The Bipartisan Solution: Securing Social Security, THE NEW
LEADER, Feb. 7, 1983, at 5-8.
37. For a discussion of Senator Harrison's significant role, see M. SwAIN,
PAT HARRisON: THE NEW DEAL YEARs 82-90 (1978).
1983]
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Robert L. Doughton,38 chairpersons of the Senate Finance and
the House Ways and Means Committees respectively and both
conservative southerners, the work of the Committee on Eco-
nomic Security staff assured inclusion of such an "insurance"
program in the law.
Another congressman, however, conservative Senator
Harry F. Byrd Sr. of Virginia, was responsible for the bill's
most significant long-range loss-deletion of the federal govern-
ment's right and obligation to determine whether a state's
OAA, ADC, and AB plans under the federal grant provided "a
reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health."39
This was the fatal blow which still prevents any effective na-
tionwide quantitative standards in federal-state welfare or un-
employment compensation programs. 40 It took a radical
departure by the Congress and the Nixon Administration, in
cooperation with Senator Russell Long, Representative Philip
Burton, and others, to repeal the OAA, ADC, and AB federal
grant-in-aid programs and substitute a wholly federally
financed and administered program in 1972-Supplemental Se-
curity Income (SSI).
Several other persons significantly influenced the shape of
the Act. Thomas Eliot,41 the drafter of the Economic Security
bill, contributed, intentionally or accidentally, significant polit-
ical assistance to the legislative process by placing federal
grants to the states for OAA in Title I at the beginning of the
bill, where it attracted the most interest and attention. The
Act's treatment of the old age problem was viewed favorably
because it would have alleviated immediately the states'
financial difficulties and assisted the large number of needy
aged in dire straits. Putting this popular program at the begin-
ning was thus a helpful factor in pushing the entire bill through
Congress. Middleton Beaman,42 the legislative drafter for the
Congress, helped make the bill more precise and more worka-
38. For a discussion of Congressman Doughton's significant role, see E.
Wrrrz, supra note 5, at 93, 95.
39. S. 1130, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(e), 79 CONG. REc. 549 (1935).
40. Quantitative standards should be distinguished from qualitative stan-
dards for process, organization, and appeals.
41. See Eliot, The Social Security Bill--25 Years After, ATL. MoNTMLY, Aug.
1960, at 72. See also Oral History of Thomas Eliot (Aug. 9, 1965) (available at
Columbia University); Letter from Thomas Eliot to Wilbur J. Cohen (Oct 3,
1983).
42. The only printed document that indicates the significant drafting and
policy role that Beaman played is the Confidential Printed Executive Commit-
tee Hearings on H.R. 7260 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1935). See also Oral History, supra note 41.
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ble, and probably helped make it feasible for the Supreme
Court to rationalize its decision "to follow the 1936 election re-
turns" and find the two federal "insurance" and the one state
"insurance" program constitutional. He may also have been
the one who suggested use of the term "social security."4 3
It is significant that at no time in 1934 or 1935 did President
Roosevelt, the Committee on Economic Security, or the key
members of Congress handling the bill deem feasible or appro-
priate any other age than sixty-five as the earliest eligible age
for receipt of old age "insurance" benefits. The age sixty-five
decision set in motion in business, industry, commerce, and
collective bargaining a practice widely accepted for many years
of utilizing age sixty-five as the normal retirement age. Subse-
quent legislation, however, provided for other eligible ages in
the Act.44
The failure to include any kind of national health insurance
in the bill may be viewed by some as wise and by others as un-
fortunate. In my judgment, it was probably the only time be-
tween 1916 and the present when the Congress might have
enacted some federal legislation relating to health insurance
for the entire population. F.D.R., following the advice of Secre-
tary Perkins, thought it too risky.45 In addition, an adminis-
trable nationwide plan was still too indefinite in form in
December 1934, or even in April or May 1935, for high-level pol-
icy determination.4 6 Whether it would have been advisable at
all depends on one's philosophy and sense of history.
43. See Letter from Thomas Eliot to Wilbur J. Cohen (Oct. 3, 1983) (indi-
cating Beaman may have suggested the title "social security").
44. Age 60 was too costly and age 70 was too high. See W. COHEN, RETIRE-
MENT POLICIES UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY 17-20 (1957).
45. Secretary Perkins was concerned about AMA opposition. As Professor
Witte explained, "It was my original belief... that it would probably be impos-
sible to do anything about health insurance in a legislative way, due to the ex-
pected strong opposition of the medical profession. I found that this was, also,
the view of Secretary Perkins. . . ." E. WrrrE, supra note 5, at 174.
46. The Committee's report on health insurance was delayed until after
the social security bill was enacted. It was never printed or published in full,
but a summary of the major recommendations can be found in Appendix IM of
E. WrrrE, supra note 5, at 205. The author plans to publish a full report in an-
other context in the near future. The basic structure of the Committee plan
was a state system aided by federal funds, guidance, and direction. The idea of
a national health insurance system operated by the federal government did not
evolve until after the Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of the
federal old age benefits plan in May 1937. The first exclusively federal propos-
als did not see light until 1940-41, and emerged full-blown in 1943 as the Wag-
ner-Murray-Dingell bill. S. 1161, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REC. 5258 (1943);
HR. 2861, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REc. 5354 (1943).
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II. CHANGES IN THE BILL DURING THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS
A selected review of significant changes to the Economic
Security bill, as it passed through the legislative process,
reveals the compromises struck and the tensions resolved to
reach the final version of the Social Security Act, as it was ulti-
mately titled, which we are so familiar with today. Such a re-
view is best undertaken by discussing changes to each of the
Act's major programs.
A. OLD-AGE BENEFITS
The Social Security Act authorized the payment of an old-
age benefit to every qualified individual, beginning at age sixty-
five and continuing until death.47 The amount of benefits de-
pended on the total wages the person earned before retire-
ment.48 In contrast, the Economic Security bil49 would have
paid benefits based on the amount of taxes paid on the individ-
ual's behalf.50 The change to a wage-based system was, in part,
intended to aid in upholding the constitutionality of both the
taxes and the benefit payments. On the other hand, the change
increased flexibility in calculating benefits and helped confirm
the program's philosophy of replacing lost wages.
With this as a goal, the Social Security Act deducted one
month's benefits from an individual's total benefits for any
month in which that person received wages for regular employ-
ment.51 Although aimed at the same goal, the bill would have
made individuals ineligible for any benefits if employed by an-
other in a gainful occupation.52 The bill also excluded non-
manual workers earning more than $250 per month,5 3
individuals covered by private pension plans,5 4 individuals em-
47. Ch. 531, § 202, 49 Stat. at 623.
48. Ch. 531, § 202(a), 49 Stat. at 623.
49. S. 1130, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 79 CONG. REC. 549 (1935). An identical bill
was introduced in the House of Representatives. H.R. 4120 & MR. 4142, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., 79 CONG. REc. 626 (1935). All citations will be to the Senate
bill.
50. S. 1130, § 405(a), 79 CONG. REC. at 551.
51. Ch. 531, § 202(d), 49 Stat. at 623. This provision was amended in 1939
and in many succeeding years, and it has turned out to be one of the most con-
troversial issues in the program. See W. COHEN, supra note 44, at 69-86.
52. S. 1130, § 405(a) (4), 79 CONG. REC. at 551. The House Ways and Means
Committee deleted this provision, but the Senate Finance Committee added
the provision that was incorporated in the Act. See supra note 51 and accompa-
nying text.
53. S. 1130, § 307(6), 79 CONG. Rac. at 551.
54. The section exempting persons covered by private pension plans was
[Vol. 68:379
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ployed by the government or covered by the Railroad Retire-
ment Act,55 and individuals reaching age sixty on or before
January 1, 1937.56 The Act did not exclude any individual be-
cause of salary, but levied taxes and paid benefits on only the
first $3000 of an individual's annual earnings. 57 The Act did not
contain a private pension exemption because the conference
committee eliminated the provision with the understanding
that a committee would be appointed to consider the Act's in-
teraction with private pension plans.58
The Act's old-age benefits were funded, in part, with reve-
nues generated from taxes imposed on both employers and em-
ployees. The taxes for both began at one percent of the
employee's wage and were to increase at one percent intervals
until a maximum of three percent was reached.5 9 The bill, how-
ever, would have levied taxes beginning at one-half of one per-
cent for both the employer and the employee and increasing in
one-half percent increments, to a maximum of two and one-half
percent.60 The bill also would have required government con-
tributions beginning in 1965 to keep the "old-age fund" ac-
tuarily sound.6 ' The Act assumed that governmental
contributions, excluding interest payments on treasury obliga-
tions held by the fund, were unnecessary.
The Social Security Act provided only one benefit payment
plan for all qualified persons, but benefits were computed to
give older and lower paid workers a proportionately higher
benefit.62 In contrast, the bill provided for two payment plans:
(1) a transitional benefit plan for individuals on whose behalf
inserted in the bill by the Senate by a vote of 51-35. See S. 1130, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess., 79 CONG. REC. 9630 (1935). The House failed to adopt the amendment
and the conference committee omitted the provision because of the technical
problems involved. 79 CONG. REC. 12,793 (1935).
55. S. 1130, § 307(4), 79 CONG. REC. at 551.
56. S. 1130, § 307(5), 79 CONG. REc. at 551. The Act, however, excluded indi-
viduals over the age of 65 from any taxation. Ch. 531, § 811(b) (4), 49 Stat. at 639.
57. Ch. 531, § 811(a), 49 Stat. at 639.
58. No further legislation ever evolved on this matter. See Cohen & Elliot,
The Advent of Social Security, in THE MAKING OF THE NEW DEAu THE INSIDERS
SPEAK 150 (K. Louchheim ed. 1983).
59. Ch. 531, § 801, 49 Stat. at 636.
60. S. 1130, § 301, 79 CONG. REC. at 550.
61. S. 1130, § 404, 79 CONG. REC. at 551. As an additional means of generat-
ing revenue, the bill provided for the voluntary issuance of annuity certificates.
S. 1130, § 501, 79 CONG. REc. at 552. The House Ways and Means Committee
eliminated the provision, but the Senate Finance Committee reinserted a simi-
lar section. The Senate, however, ultimately failed to approve the issuance of
the certificates.
62. Ch. 531, § 202(a)(1)-(2), 49 Stat. at 623.
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taxes were first to be paid during the years 1937 to 1941; and (2)
a permanent benefit plan for individuals on whose behalf taxes
were first to be paid in 1942 or thereafter.63 The computation
was based on average wages. The bill also would have allowed
a recipient with a dependent spouse to "elect to receive a joint
survivorship annuity... in lieu of the annuity provided" to the
recipient individually,64 but the Act did not allow such an
election.
To encourage states to provide financial assistance to the
needy elderly, the Social Security Act authorized and appropri-
ated funds for payments to states having an approved old-age
assistance plan.65 The Social Security Board's approval was
conditioned on whether the state plan fulfilled each of seven
criteria.66 The bill, on the other hand, went further and re-
quired not only that the state plan meet certain criteria,67 but
63. S. 1130, § 405(b) (l)-(2), 79 CONG. REC. at 551.
64. S. 1130, § 405(b)(3), 79 CONG. Rac. at 551.
65. Ch. 531, § 1, 49 Stat. at 620. The Act provided that states prevented by
their constitutions from participating were not required to meet the conditions
until July 1, 1937. Ch. 531, § 3(a), 49 Stat. at 621. The Senate also accepted an
amendment allowing the federal government to pay up to $15 per month for
each elderly person to any state without a system of federal-state participation
until July 1937. 79 CONG. REC. 9640 (1935).
66. Ch. 531, § 2(b), 49 Stat. at 620. The seven requirements were as follows:
A State plan for old-age assistance must (1) provide that it shall be in
effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by
them, be mandatory upon them; (2) provide for financial participation
by the State; (3) either provide for the establishment or designation of
a single State agency to administer the plan, or provide for the estab-
lishment or designation of a single State agency to supervise the ad-
ministration of the plan; (4) provide for granting to any individual,
whose claim for old-age assistance is denied, an opportunity for a fair
hearing before such State agency (5) provide such methods of admin-
istration (other than those relating to selection, tenure of office, and
compensation of personnel) as are found by the Board to be necessary
for the efficient operation of the plan; (6) provide that the State agency
will make such reports, in such form and containing such information,
as the Board may from time to time find necessary to assure the cor-
rectness and verification of such reports; and (7) provide that, if the
State or any of its political subdivisions collects from the estate of any
recipient of old-age assistance any amount with respect to old-age
assistance furnished him under the plan, one-half of the net amount so
collected shall be promptly paid to the United States. Any payment so
made shall be deposited in the Treasury to the credit of the appropria-
tion for the purposes of this title.
Id.
67. S. 1130, § 4, 79 CONG. REC. at 549. The bill's conditions were as follows:
A State plan for old-age assistance, offered by the State authority for
approval, shall be approved by the Administrator only if such plan-
(a) Is State-wide, includes substantial financial participation by
the State, and, if administered by subdivisions of the State, is
mandatory upon such subdivisions; and
(b) Establishes or designates a single State authority to adminis-
[Vol. 68:379
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
also that the state have accepted the provisions of the federal
bi11.68 And, while the Act authorized an appropriation sufficient
to carry out the purposes of the grants, 69 the bill set a specific
dollar amount of $125 million for each fiscal year after 1936.70
Although both the Act and the bill placed conditions on the
Board's approval of the state plans, the nature of the conditions
varied. For example, the bill would have required the state to
provide assistance that furnished "a reasonable subsistence
compatible with decency and health,"71 but the Act contains no
such requirement.72 In addition, the bill mandated that the
ter or supervise the administration of the plan and insures methods of
administration which are approved by the Administrator; and
(c) Grants to any person whose claim for assistance is denied the
right to appeal to such State authority; and
(d) Provides that such State authority shall make full and com-
plete reports to the Federal Emergency Relief Administration in ac-
cordance with rules and regulations to be prescribed by the
Administrator; and
(e) Furnishes assistance at least great enough to provide, when
added to the income of the aged recipient, a reasonable subsistence
compatible with decency and health; and, whether or not it denies
assistance to any aged persons, at least does not deny assistance to
any person who
(1) Is a United States citizen; and
(2) Has resided in the State for 5 years or more within the 10
years immediately preceding application for assistance; and
(3) Has an income which when joined with the income of such
person's spouse, is inadequate to provide a reasonable subsistence
compatible with decency and health; and
(4) Is 65 years of age or older- Provided, That until January 1,
1940, but not thereafter, assistance may be denied to otherwise eli-
gible persons who are less than 70 years of age; and
(f) Provides that so much of the sum paid as assistance to any
aged recipient as represents the share of the United States Govern-
ment in such assistance shall be a lien on the estate of the aged recipi-
ent which, upon his death, shall be enforced by the State, and that the
net amount realized by the enforcement of such lien shall be deemed
to be part of the State's allotment from the United States Government
for the year in which such lien was enforced: Provided, That no such
lien shall be enforced against any real estate of the recipient while it is
occupied by the recipient's surviving spouse, if the latter is not more
than 15 years younger than the recipient, and does not marry again.
Id.
68. S. 1130, § 2, 79 CONG. REc. at 549. Both the bill and the Act also pro-
vided similar grants to the states for aid to dependent children. Because the
conditions for approval were the same as for the old-age benefit programs, the
ADC grants will not be directly discussed here. See S. 1130, §§ 201-211, 79 CONG.
REc. at 550; ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. at 627-29.
69. Ch. 531, § 1, 49 Stat. at 620.
70. S. 1130, § 1, 79 CONG. REc. at 549.
71. S. 1130, § 4(e), 79 CONG. REc. at 549.
72. The bill also would have required substantial financial participation by
the state for old-age assistance. S. 1130, § 4(a), 79 CONG. REC. at 549. The Act,
however, dropped the word substantial and required only financial participa-
tion. Ch. 531, § 2(a)(2), 49 Stat. at 620.
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state plan insure methods of administration approved by the
federal government.7 3 In contrast, the Act limited federal con-
trol of the state plan's administration to matters other than se-
lection, tenure of office, and compensation of personnel.7 4
Further examples of the different conditions in the Act and
the bill are found in the residency and benefit recapture provi-
sions. Under the bill, the state old-age benefit plan could re-
quire only that an applicant reside in the state for at least five
of the ten years preceding the application.7 5 The Act refined
that condition to provide that the state's residency require-
ments could not exceed five years during the preceding nine
years and could not require the recipient to have resided in the
state for more than one year immediately preceding the appli-
cation.7 6 Finally, the bill would have made the federal govern-
ment's share of the state benefit paid to any aged person a lien
on the recipient's estate,77 while the Social Security Act pro-
vides only that if the state recaptures any amount from the re-
cipient's estate, it must pay one-half to the United States.7 8
Board approval of the state plan, however, did not guaran-
tee that the state would always receive payments under the
Act. If the Board, after reasonable notice and opportunity for a
hearing, found that a state changed its plan so that it no longer
complied with the conditions for approval, it could withhold
payments until the plan once again met with the Board's ap-
proval.V9 The bill had a similar provision except that the Board
could make such a determination without notice and opportu-
nity for a hearing.80
B. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Unlike the old-age benefit program, which envisioned both
a state and a federal benefit, unemployment compensation
under the Social Security Act was designed as a state program
with financial assistance provided by the federal government.
The Act authorized the appropriation of federal monies to as-
sist the states in the administration of their unemployment
73. S. 1130, § 4(b), 79 CONG. REC. at 549.
74. Ch. 531, § 2(a) (5), 49 Stat. at 620.
75. S. 1130, § 4(e) (2), 79 CONG. REC. at 549.
76. Ch. 531, § 3(a), 49 Stat. at 620.
77. S. 1130, § 4(f), 79 CONG. REC. at 549.
78. Ch. 531, § 2(a) (7), 49 Stat. at 620.
79. Ch. 531, § 4, 49 Stat. at 621.
80. S. 1130, § 6(e), 79 CONG. REC. at 549.
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compensation laws.81 The amount of the payment to any state
was to be determined by the Social Security Board "based on
(1) the population of the State; (2) an estimate of the number
of persons covered by the State law and of the cost of proper
administration of such law; and (3) such other factors as the
Board finds relevant."8 2 While the bill set forth the same basic
payment scheme, the grants were to be apportioned among the
states based only on the amount required to properly adminis-
ter the state's law.83
Like the old-age benefit program, the grants were given
only to states that had unemployment compensation laws ap-
proved by the Board.84 The conditions placed on receiving
Board approval were similar under both the Act and the bill.
One significant difference, however, was that the bill would
have required the administrative positions in the state to be
filled on a non-partisan, merit basis,85 while the Act restricted
the Board's control over the selection, tenure of office, and com-
pensation of state personnel.86 Another difference between the
Act and the bill is found in the circumstances under which the
Board could withhold payments. The bill allowed withholding
of payments whenever the Board found that the state law no
longer complied with the conditions specified in the law and
notified the state treasurer of its findings. 87 The Act's require-
ments for withholding were similar, but it allowed withholding
only after the Board gave the state notice and opportunity for
hearing.8 8
In addition to authorizing grants to the states for unem-
ployment compensation, the Social Security Act imposed a tax
on businesses employing eight or more persons on each of
some twenty days in a year.89 The bill, however, would have
taxed businesses employing four or more persons within at
least thirteen weeks in a calendar year.90 Under both the bill9l
81. Ch. 531, § 301, 49 Stat. at 626.
82. Ch. 531, § 302, 49 Stat. at 626.
83. S. 1130, § 406, 79 CONG. REc. at 552.
84. Ch. 531, § 303, 49 Stat. at 626.
85. Ch. 531, § 303(a), 49 Stat. at 626.
86. S. 1130, § 406, 79 CONG. REC. at 552.
87. S. 1130, § 407(b), 79 CONG. REC. at 552.
88. Ch. 531, § 303(b), 49 Stat. at 627.
89. Ch. 531, §§ 901, 907, 49 Stat. at 639, 642.
90. S. 1130, § 606, 79 CONG. REc. at 553.
91. "When used in this title... [t] he term 'employer' shall include every
person who employs an employee,.., except that it shall not include the Fed-
eral Government, the States or any political subdivision thereof, a governmen-
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and the Act92 certain types of businesses were excluded from
taxation by definition, although five more categories were ex-
cluded in the Act than in the bill.93 The amount of the tax also
differed between the bill and the Act. The bill levied taxes
based on an index of industrial production,9 4 but the Act set
the tax rate at one percent of an employer's paid-out wages for
1936, two percent for 1937, and three percent thereafter.95
The amount of the tax due, however, was not absolute-
both the Act96 and the bi1l97 allowed employers to credit
against the federal tax up to ninety percent of their contribu-
tions to a state unemployment fund. Employers were allowed
this credit only if the Social Security Board found that the law
establishing the state unemployment fund met certain criteria.
Both the Act98 and the bill99 placed similar conditions on ap-
proval, although the bill would have imposed the additional re-
quirement that the state accept the provisions of the Wagner-
Peyser Act creating a federal-state system of employment of-
fices. 00 The Act provided that unemployment compensation
payments had to be made solely through public employment
offices.1O1 Withdrawal of the Board's approval was allowed
under the Act, but not the bill, if the Board found either that
the state law no longer contained the required provisions or
tal instrumentality, or any employer subject to the Railroad Retirement Act
... " S. 1130, § 307(4), 79 CONG. REC. at 551.
92. When used in this title ... [t]he term "employment" means any
service,. . . except (1) Agricultural labor; (2) Domestic service in a pri-
vate home; (3) Service performed as an officer or member of the crew
of a vessel on the navigable waters of the United States; (4) Service
performed by an individual in the employ of his son, daughter, or
spouse, and service performed by a child under the age of twenty-one
in the employ of his father or mother; (5) Service performed in the em-
ploy of the United States Government or of an instrumentality of the
United States; (6) Service performed in the employ of a State, a polit-
ical subdivision thereof, or an instrumentality of one or more States or
political subdivisions; (7) Service performed in the employ of a corpo-
ration, community chest, funds or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.
Ch. 531, § 907(c), 49 Stat. at 643.
93. Compare supra note 91 with supra note 92.
94. S. 1130, § 601, 79 CONG. REc. at 552.
95. Ch. 531, § 901, 49 Stat. at 639.
96. Ch. 531, § 902, 49 Stat. at 639.
97. S. 1130, § 602, 79 CONG. REc. at 553.
98. Ch. 531, § 903(a) (1)-(6), 49 Stat. at 640.
99. S. 1130, § 602(b)-(f), 79 CONG. Rac. at 553.
100. S. 1130, § 602(a), 79 CONG. REc. at 553.
101. Ch. 531, § 303(a) (2), 49 Stat. at 627.
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that the state failed to comply substantially with any provision,
and if the Board gave reasonable notice and opportunity for
hearing.102
After 1937, additional credit was allowed to any employer
who, because of favorable employment experience or adequate
reserves, was permitted by the state law to reduce payments.
The additional credit was available under either the ActlO3 or
the bill,104 although different conditions were placed on its
availability. The bill provided that the additional credit would
be permitted only if the employer continued to contribute one
percent to a pooled state fund and, if reserve accounts existed,
the employer's reserve was not less than fifteen percent of the
total payroll.105 The Act, on the other hand, contained three al-
ternate conditions,106 depending on whether the employer con-
tributed to a pooled fund,107 a guaranteed employment
account,108 or a separate reserve account. l0 9
C. AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN
The Social Security Act also authorized federal appropria-
tions to enable the states to furnish financial assistance to
needy dependent children." 0 The appropriated funds were to
be used to make payments to states having Board-approved aid
plans."' The aid to dependent children program was designed
to match, with federal monies, up to one-third of the state's
costs. The bill did not set a dollar limit on the matching
funds,112 but the Act limited the federal matching to $18 for the
first child and $12 for each additional child."3 Under the bill,
102. Ch. 531, § 902(b) (c), 49 Stat. at 640.
103. Ch. 531, § 909, 49 Stat. at 643.
104. S. 1130, § 607, 79 CONG. REC. at 554.
105. S. 1130, § 608, 79 CONG. REC. at 554. As passed by the House, the bill did
not allow experience rating credits and thus provided that only pooled state
funds would exist. See Letter from Edwin E. Witte to Harry Hopkins (Feb. 26,
1935), reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNTrED STATES: INCOME SECUR-
ITy 143 (R. Stevens ed. 1970); E. WrITE, supra note 5, at 133-35.
106. The alternate conditions were inserted by the Senate Finance Commit-
tee at the insistence of Senator Robert M. LaFollette, a Republican from
Wisconsin.
107. Ch. 531, § 910(a)(1), 49 Stat. at 644.
108. Ch. 531, § 910(a) (2), 49 Stat. at 644.
109. Ch. 531, § 910(a) (3), 49 Stat. at 644.
110. Ch. 531, § 401, 49 Stat. at 627.
111. Id.
112. S. 1130, § 206, 79 CONG. REC. at 550.
113. Ch. 531, § 403(a), 49 Stat. at 628. Congress initially overlooked authoriz-
ing a payment for the parent or other caretaker, but corrected its omission with
later legislation. The $18 figure, however, has remained in the law for nearly
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allotments to the states were to be: (a) made annually; (b)
paid quarterly; (c) proportionately reduced if the sum of all al-
lotments exceeded the appropriation; and (d) supplemented by
any amount of funds not otherwise allotted, determined by
need." 4 Under the Act, allotments and payments were both
made quarterly, with no provision for either a reduction in al-
lotment or for supplementary allotments." 5
D. OTHER PROGRAMS
Vocational rehabilitation grants were not in the original
bill, but were added by the House Ways and Means Committee.
The bill also did not contain any specific provision for aid to the
blind, but the Senate Finance Committee added one and appro-
priated $1.5 million for matching grants, although the matching
grants provision was ultimately eliminated." 6 The bill required
a finding of need prior to issuing federal public health grants," 7
but the Act provided that amounts paid to states be determined
in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed after con-
sultation with a conference of state and territorial health au-
thoritiesnS and were to be based on population, special health
problems, and financial needs of the states." 9 The bill pro-
vided a matching grant mechanism for federal support for
child-welfare services.120 The Act, on the other hand, provided
that federal funds would be expended on a partial-payment ba-
sis for the states' cost of providing such services.12' Finally, the
Senate attempted to add a section on Indian pensions to the
bill, but the Conference Committee defeated the
amendment.122
E. ADMINSTRATION
As noted earlier, the bill provided for a Social Insurance
fifty years. This is but one indication of the extent to which the program has
been adversely affected by congressional and public policy, and serves to illus-
trate the point that "children do not vote." The problems facing federal aid pro-
grams for dependent children, "welfare," are complex and controversial.
114. S. 1130, § 207, 79 CONG. REC. at 550.
115. Ch. 531, § 403(a), 49 Stat. at 628.
116. Ch. 531, §§ 1001-1006, 49 Stat. at 645-47.
117. S. 1130, § 802, 79 CONG. REC. at 556.
118. Ch. 531, § 602(c), 49 Stat. at 634.
119. Ch. 531, § 602(a), 49 Stat. at 634.
120. S. 1130, § 701 (a) (1), 79 CONG. REc. at 554.
121. Ch. 531, § 521(a), 49 Stat. at 633.
122. See S. REP. No. 1540, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935) (conferees receding
on amendment granting pensions to Indians).
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Board established in the Department of Labor.123 The House
version made the Social Security Board an independent
agency, but the Senate put it back in the Department of Labor.
The House version ultimately prevailed.124 In the bill, old-age
assistance and aid to dependent children were to be adminis-
tered by the Federal Emergency Relief Administrator, 25 al-
though the President was authorized to transfer administration
of those programs to any other governmental officer or
agency. 26 The Act ultimately assigned these functions to the
Social Security Board.127
Ill. USE OF THE TERM "SOCIAL SECURITY" AND
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PROGRAM AS
"INSURANCE"
As noted in the Introduction to this Article, one unintended
aspect of the 1935 Act was worldwide adoption of the term "so-
cial security." The original bill was entitled the "Economic Se-
curity Act."128 When the House Committee on Ways and
Means reported out a revised and clean bill in April 1935, how-
ever, the legislative drafters decided, without too much discus-
sion or consideration of its potential significance, to distinguish
it from the earlier version by renaming it the "Social Security
Act."' 29 When the Act was considered, "social insurance" was
the term widely used in European and American reports, stud-
ies, and books on the subject. "Social insurance," however,
failed to encompass the various kinds of assistance programs
123. S. 1130, § 401, 79 CONG. REC. at 551.
124. Ch. 531, § 701, 49 Stat. at 635. The author strongly believes that the
existence of a bipartisan "board" to administer the program assisted in build-
ing wide public acceptance of social security as a nonpolitical operation.
125. S. 1130, § 2, 79 CONG. REC. at 549.
126. S. 1130, § 209, 79 CONG. REC. at 550.
127. Ch. 531, § 702, 49 Stat. at 635.
128. S. 1130, § 903, 79 CONG. REC. at 556.
129. See H.R. 7260, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1005, 79 CONG. REC. 6067 (1935)
(§ 1005 became § 1105 in the Act, ch. 531, § 1105, 49 Stat. at 648). The term "so-
cial security," however, had been used in the United States before 1935. For ex-
ample, it is found in the cornerstone of the Department of Justice building in
Washington. The most directly related use of the term was by a small but influ-
ential organization in New York City, the American Association for Social Se-
curity, which was headed by an unusually outstanding scholar and
propagandist, Abraham Epstein. The previous name of the Association was the
American Association for Old Age Security, suggested by Emil Frankel in the
winter of 1926 in lieu of "pensions." Letter from Abraham Epstein to Wilbur J.
Cohen (March 4, 1941) (available in the library of the Department of Health
and Human Services), quoted in READINGS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 39-40 (W. Haber
& W. Cohen eds. 1948).
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and other social services contained in the Act. The term "social
security" caught on and was used by New Zealand in 1938, then
by other countries, and finally by the International Labour Of-
fice.130 It thus became a term of worldwide usage.
On my recommendation, the Social Security Board author-
ized use of the terms "old age insurance," "unemployment in-
surance," and "social insurance" in public discussions and
Board publications immediately after the Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of the Act. Subsequently, the Board
recommended 31 and Congress accepted "Federal Insurance
Contributions Act" (FICA) as the short title for the Internal
Revenue Code old age and survivors' revenue provisions.
The terms adopted for the new programs became the focus
of much objection by opponents and critics of the social secur-
ity program. Innumerable articles by persons with contrasting
views argued that the program was not "insurance," and that
the revenues were not "contributions." 3 2 The assault was led
primarily by persons with economics backgrounds and carried
forward by publicists and popular writers; it was not taken up
by lawyers, insurance scholars, or the insurance industry-peo-
ple who understood the theoretical and historical aspects of in-
surance philosophy and calculations.
The emphasis on "insurance" and "contributions" terminol-
ogy created a sharp distinction in the public mind between
"welfare" and "social security." This distinction was main-
tained until 1965. After 1965, the efforts of many publicists and
economists to group all government payments and programs
under the heading of "social welfare" tended, unfortunately, in
my opinion, to be more generally accepted.
Robert J. Myers, the former actuary of the Social Security
Administration, aptly summarized the validity of using insur-
ance terminology in connection with social security: "It would
seem that this is justified because of the broad pooling mecha-
130. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LABouR OFFICE, THE COST OF SOCIAL SECUR-
rrY: TENTH INTERNATIONAL INQUIRY, 1975-77 (1978).
131. This again happened on my recommendation, although it was a recom-
mendation that I now regret because "FICA" is not widely understood as ap-
plying to Social Security.
132. See, for example, Milton Friedman's views in W. COHEN & M. FRIED-
MAN, SOCIAL SECURTY: UNIVERSAL OR SELECTIVE? 27 (1972) ('The very name-
old age and survivors insurance-is a blatant attempt to mislead the public into
identifying a compulsory tax and benefit system with private, voluntary, and in-
dividual purchase of individually assured benefits.").
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nism utilized in social security systems."133 Moreover, the
Supreme Court stated in 1960 that "[t]he Social Security sys-
tem may be accurately described as a form of social insurance,
enacted pursuant to Congress' power to 'spend money in aid of
the "general welfare."' '134
The old age "insurance" provisions of 1935 had an impor-
tant impact in eventually stimulating the establishment and
sale of private insurance to supplement the basic "floor of pro-
tection" provided by the public plan. The addition in 1939 of
monthly survivors' benefits (such as those to widows and chil-
dren) stimulated the sale of private life insurance. Private dis-
ability insurance also became more generally available. Along
with private voluntary health insurance, the United States has
an extensive volume of nongovernmental insurance protection
which is not unrelated to the enactment in 1935 of the "social
insurance" emphasis, as contrasted with other types of social
security or social welfare programs.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In the almost fifty years since the law was enacted, many
articles have explored why Congress did not enact something
different or "better" than it did.135 A number of other alterna-
tives for old age and unemployment benefits were discussed by
the Committee on Economic Security, its Advisory Council,
and the Congress, but there was such a need and demand for
prompt action that F.D.R.'s recommendations were accepted
with only minor basic dissent in Congress. The need to create
an Act that would survive any constitutional challenge directly
influenced the shape and content of the Social Security Act.
It is frequently overlooked that the United States Supreme
Court in 1934-36 was controlled by a group of hard-line conserv-
atives with a negative conception of the federal and state gov-
ernmental roles in social and economic legislation. Frances
133. R. MYERS, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 8
(1965).
134. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609, reh'g denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960)
(quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)). The government brief
stated that "[t]he OASI program is in no sense a federally-administered 'insur-
ance program' under which each worker pays 'premiums' over the years and
acquires at retirement an indefeasible right." Brief for the United States at 10.
This statement leaves open, however, the possibility that OASI is an insurance
program of a type other than that specifically described.
135. See, e.g., Old-Age Security and the Welfare Titles of the Social Security
Act" A Symposium, 3 LAw & CONTIEaP. PROBS. 173 (1936); Note, Insecurity
Under Social Security, 9 U. CHm. L. REV. 127 (1941).
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Perkins, Arthur J. Altmeyer, Edwin E. Witte, and J. Douglas
Brown, because of their labor legislation expertise, were cogni-
zant of the Court's decisions overturning labor and social legis-
lation.136 They may also have been familiar with the important
constitutional precedent of President Franklin Pierce's 1854
veto of a bi137 granting public land to the states for the indi-
gent insane.138 While most of these presidential advisors were
not lawyers,139 they were all as familiar with, and as adept and
adroit about, legal issues as any qualified constitutional lawyer.
Thus, their primary worry in 1934-35 was that the "Horse-and-
Buggy" Court would invalidate the basic social security
legislation.140
Two significant Supreme Court decisions indicated the
level of federal involvement that the Court would tolerate. In
Frothingham v. Mellon'4 ' the Court in effect upheld the Shep-
136. Some of these people had studied the Court's actions intensively. See,
e.g., A. Altmeyer, The Industrial Commission of Wisconsin: A Case Study in
Labor Law Administration (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1932).
Altmeyer's familiarity with labor law and his concern with due process were re-
sponsible for the appeals process and the merit system in the law. Witte par-
ticipated with Felix Frankfurter and Donald Richberg in the drafting of the
Norris-La Guardia Act on injunctions in labor disputes. See Papers of Wilbur J.
Cohen, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
137. Senator Solomon Foot introduced "a bill making a grant of lands to the
several States and Territories of the Union for the benefit of indigent insane
persons" on December 21, 1853. Indigent Insane Persons, 33d Cong., 1st Sess.,
28 CONG. GLOBE 73 (1853).
138. On vetoing the bill, President Pierce noted:
I cannot find any authority in the Constitution for making the Fed-
eral Government the great almoner of public charity throughout the
United States. To do so would, in my judgment, be contrary to the let-
ter and spirit of the Constitution, and subversive of the whole theory
upon which the Union of these States is founded. And if it were admis-
sible to contemplate the exercise of this power, for any object
whatever, I cannot avoid the belief that it would, in the end, be prejudi-
cial rather than beneficial to the noble offices of charity, to have the
charge of them transferred from the States to the Federal Government.
Indigent Insane Persons, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., 28 CONG. GLOBE 1060-61 (1854).
139. Eliot and Wyzanski were lawyers, as was Barbara Nachtrieb
Armstrong.
140. Justice Roberts abandoned the Court's conservative bloc in March 1937
when, according to Professor T.R. Powell, he performed "the switch in time that
saved nine" in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 397 (1937). See P. BOB-
BITr, CONSTITUIONAL FATE 39 (1982). I am indebted to Professors Bobbitt and
Dagmar Hamilton for alerting me to this important fact, because it tends to in-
dicate that the Roosevelt Court Packing Plan may have been unnecessary to
assure Court approval of the social security program.
141. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The Maternity Act of 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (re-
pealed 1927), established a federal bureau to administer state programs
designed to reduce maternal and infant mortality. 262 U.S. at 479. States that
participated in the program received federal grants-in-aid. Id. The state of
Massachusetts claimed that the Act was unconstitutional because its "rights
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pard-Towner Act42 as a constitutional federal grant-in-aid.
Frothingham thus provided strong precedent for using some
kind of federal grants to the states. Not only were they deemed
a sound political and administrative way to build and support
state agencies, but such grants apparently would pass constitu-
tional muster. Most states already were active in the social
policy field and the Perkins group, based on their experience as
state administrators and students of state legislative programs,
saw little possibility of using exclusively federally-operated
programs143 in an era without the administrative tools of com-
puters, television, and satellites.
The Wagner-Peyser Act,144 the one major piece of related
federal economic security legislation passed in early 1933, influ-
enced the administrative shape of the Social Security Act. It
provided a system of employment offices initially intended to
be developed on a federal-state basis. That alone would have
ensured that any system of unemployment compensation
would have been of a federal-state character since it was neces-
sary, for an effective unemployment insurance system, that the
federal-state employment offices serve as the labor exchange
and placement units.
The second Supreme Court decision that the framers of the
social security program were familiar with was Florida v. Mel-
lon,145 upholding the Revenue Act of 1926 credit offset de-
vice.14 6 Justice Brandeis had suggested this device to his
daughter and son-in-law, Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush and
Paul Raushenbush, of the University of Wisconsin.147 It subse-
quently became the basis for the unemployment compensation
and powers as a sovereign state and the rights of its citizens ha[d] been in-
vaded and usurped by these expenditures and acts." Id. The Court did not
reach the merits, but upheld the Act based on the plaintif's lack of standing.
142. Maternity Act of 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (repealed 1927).
143. For a discussion of the constitutional issues, see generally Denby, The
Case Against the Constitutionality of the Social Security Ac4 3 LAw Am CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 315 (1936); Shulman, The Case for the Constitutionality of the So-
cial Security Act 3 LAw AND CoTrEzm'. PROBs. 298 (1936). Shulman had clerked
for Justice Brandeis and Denby for Justice Holmes.
144. Ch. 49, 48 Stat. 113 (1933) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 49 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980)).
145. 273 U.S. 12 (1927).
146. Ch. 27, § 301, 44 Stat. 9 (1926) (current version at 6 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)
and 48 U.S.C. § 845 (1976)). This federal inheritance tax law was held constitu-
tional because it "was passed by Congress in pursuance of its power to lay and
collect taxes." Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. at 17.
147. PA. RAUSHENBUSH & E.B. RAUSHENBUSH, OUR "U.C." STORY: 1930-1967,
at 38 (1979).
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tax credit offset device in Title IX of the Social Security Act,148
which has remained basically unchanged for the past fifty
years.
Sponsors of the 1935 pioneer social security legislation
were unable to visualize the revolutions that would occur in
1937 as a result of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court Packing
Plan."149 Although Roosevelt lost the battle for control of the
Supreme Court in what was probably the most ignominious de-
feat of his career, he nevertheless won the war for Court deci-
sions upholding his New Deal programs. In 1937, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations
Act,150 the old-age benefits'51 and unemployment compensation
features of the Social Security Act,152 and the state unemploy-
ment compensation laws.153 The historic Court decisions on so-
cial security, however, were predicted by Justice Stone when
he told Secretary Perkins, "The taxing power of the Federal
Government, my dear; the taxing power is sufficient for every-
thing you want and need."'5 4
I attended the oral argument before the Court and heard
148. Ch. 531, § 902, 49 Stat. at 639.
149. The basic design of the Court Packing Plan was as follows:
When any judge of a court of the United States... has heretofore or
hereafter attained the age of seventy years and has held a commission
or commissions as judge of any such court or courts at least ten years
... the President, for each such judge who has not so resigned or re-
tired, shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, shall appoint one additional judge to the court to which the for-
mer is commissioned. . .. [No judge shall] be so appointed if such ap-
pointment would result in ... more than fifteen members of the
Supreme Court ....
S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1937). The plan would have allowed
Roosevelt to add six members to the Court because six justices were over 70
years of age. G. GuNTimi, CASES AND MATERIALs ON CONsTrrtnOAL LAW 150
(10th ed. 1980).
150. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
151. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). Note that Helvering was argued
May 5, 1937, and decided May 24, 1937. Very speedy action after the Court
Packing Plan defeat! In 1983 several important oral histories relating to the
1934-35 period became available through the author's efforts. The oral histories
were deposited in Butler Library, Columbia University. They throw light on
several of the sharp differences of opinion, both about old age and unemploy-
ment insurance, among the staff of the Committee on Economic Security. Pro-
fessor Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong was the center of much of the most
belligerent activity. Her oral history, taped in 1965, is 318 pages. The more dis-
passionate oral history of Murray Latimer is 51 pages. These oral histories and
commentaries are currently in the possession of the author and will eventually
be deposited in the L.B.J. Library and Museum in Austin, Texas along with nu-
merous other oral histories and documents on social security from 1934-69.
152. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
153. Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
154. F. PERKrns, supra note 35, at 286.
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Justice Cardozo read the decision. These were momentous ex-
periences for me-a young lad not quite of twenty-four years.
Charles Wyzanski, later a federal district judge in Boston, Mas-
sachusetts, made the oral rebuttal in defense of the legislation
in what I thought then, and still think now, was one of the most
brilliant presentations that I had ever heard.155 He argued his
case without a note, answered questions with great facility, and
was a master of sophisticated decorum in the highest court of
the land. Mr. Robert H. Jackson, then an assistant Attorney
General, made the opening arguments.
Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo's opinions upholding
the federal old-age benefits program, the federal unemploy-
ment compensation program, and the state unemployment
compensation programs were filled with facts, observations,
footnotes, and literary-poetic sentences. Justice Cardozo read
the decisions with a cadence and power of language indicating
his sense of their historic and far-reaching significance. Alan-
son Willcox, later my General Counsel in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, told me that he had heard
from his legal colleagues that Justice Cardozo had thought of
retiring from the Supreme Court in 1937 but delayed his retire-
ment until after the social security decisions because of their
significant historic dimensions. There are sentences and
phrases in Cardozo's opinions that still remain etched in my
mind. Some of the language became permanent additions to
social policy literature.15 6
V. THE 1936 LANDON ELECTION CAMPAIGN
Within a year after passage of the 1935 Act, Republican
155. See S. Doc. No. 71, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) (oral arguments before
the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Davis). See also P. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL
LAWYERS 290-91 (1982) (discussion of Wyzanski's arguments in the Social Se-
curity Act cases and the Court's adoption of the Hamiltonian position that Con-
gress could use the taxing power to provide for the general welfare).
156. See, for example, the following lines from Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937): "The line must still be drawn between one welfare and an-
other... The discretion belongs to Congress," id. at 640; "Nor is the concept
of general welfare static. Needs that were narrow and parochial a century ago
may be interwoven in our day with the well being of the Nation. What is criti-
cal or urgent changes with the times," id. at 641; '"The hope behind this statute
is to save men and women from the rigors of the poor house as well as from the
haunting fear that such a lot awaits them when journey's end is near," id.; "The
problem is plainly national in area and dimensions. Moreover, laws of the sep-
arate states cannot deal with it effectively. Congress, at least, had a basis for
that belief ... Only a power that is national can serve the interests of all," id.
at 644.
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business and conservative leaders began a heated campaign
against the old age "benefits" program. The Presidential cam-
paign of 1936 offered an excellent political opportunity for this
attack. The Republican candidate, Alf Landon, although a pro-
gressive Republican for that day, became, somewhat innocently
in my judgment, party to a vicious campaign against social se-
curity undertaken by the Republican National Committee.
In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, my birthplace and the home
state of several pioneers of social security, including Commons,
Altmeyer, Witte, Groves, and the Raushenbushes, candidate
Landon attacked the old age program as a "cruel hoax" and "a
fraud on the working man."15 7 He criticized the program, urged
its repeal, but offered no specific alternatives. 15 8 As the cam-
paign concluded, he conjured up a foreboding picture of the
federal program for the aged in a St. Louis speech: "Imagine
the field opened to federal snooping. Are these twenty-six mil-
lion [workers] going to be fingerprinted? Are their photo-
graphs going to be kept on fie in a Washington office? Are they
going to have identification tags put around their necks?"
Some Republican spokespersons expanded this imagery
and warned that workers would be required to wear metal dog
tags. The Chairperson of the Republican National Committee
said that Roosevelt's humanity extended only to having these
dog tags made of stainless steel so they would not discolor the
workers' skin.
The Hearst newspapers vigorously opposed F.D.R. and
printed numerous misrepresentations and sensationalizations.
One picture showed a man labelled "YOU" with a metal dog
tag around his neck, and another showed a faked application
form with a caption warning that a recipient's record in the ifies
of Washington would be
as complete as any convict's or prisoner's. Your personal life will be
laid bare. Your religion and church you attend will be listed. Your
physical defects will go down in black and white. Your life will be an
open book. . . . You are to be regimented-catalogued-put on fie.
This is what the Roosevelt Administration did not intend you to know
until AFIER the election.15 9
157. N.Y. Times, September 27, 1936, at 31, col. 3-4. For a detailed and in-
formative historical analysis of the 1936-39 crisis, controversy, and compromise,
see Berkowitz, The First Social Security Crisis, PROLOGuE, Fall 1983, at 139-49.
158. Landon's speech was drafted by Charles Taft (the brother of Senator
Robert Taft). Taft did not insert the phrase "cruel hoax" in his draft but be-
lieves Landon's speech writer, Sherwin Badger, contributed the phrase. Letter
from Charles P. Taft to Wilbur J. Cohen (Jan. 6, 1970).
159. New York American, Nov. 2, 1936. See also M.B. SCHNAPPER, AMERICAN
LABOR: A PICTORiAL SocmTY HISTORY 485 (1972).
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The election ended with a blitzkreig Republican payroll-envel-
ope-stuffmg campaign about ten days before the election. One
of the items included in the payroll envelopes stated: "YOU'RE
SENTENCED TO A WEEKLY PAY REDUCTION FOR ALL
YOUR WORKING LIFE. YOU'LL HAVE TO SERVE THE
SENTENCE UNLESS YOU HELP REVERSE IT NOVEMBER
3.,,
Neither Landon nor the Republican party offered any spe-
cifics during the campaign about an alternative. Charles Taft,
who prepared the initial draft of the Landon speech, was con-
cerned almost solely about the probable "large reserve fund,"
which never occurred, and strongly endorsed a pay-as-you-go
financing system, which eventually did occur.160 Donald R. Mc-
Coy, Alf Landon's biographer, speculated that "Landon's pen-
sions would be administered by the states, the funds coming
from a direct, widely distributed federal tax earmarked for this
purpose."161
We will never know precisely what Landon had in mind or
what he would have proposed on social security if elected. Ap-
parently, Landon did not have a completely thought-out plan of
what he would do regarding social security in 1936.162 Landon's
defeat, however, cemented F.D.R.'s determination to go ahead
with implementation of the 1935 old age program in 1937 when
the initial tax became effective. With the Act's constitutionality
upheld in May 1937, the program became accepted as part of
160. The actuarial estimates of future benefits, taxes, and costs made for the
bill and the Act became a controversial issue. The estimates showed an even-
tual reserve fund in 1980 of $56 billion, which in 1935 was beyond comprehen-
sion, either in terms of the gross national product or the national debt. This
fact precipitated Landon's and Vandenberg's concerns with respect to the pro-
grams. The actual reserves in 1980 turned out to be $23 billion in a much differ-
ent economic context. For an interesting discussion of the estimates and
subsequent occurrences, see Myers, Actual Costs of the Social Security System
Over the Years Compared with 1935 Estimates, Soc. SEcuRrry BumL., March
1982, at 13-15.
161. D. McCoy, LANoN OF KANSAS 306 (1966). The author had extensive
correspondence with Professor McCoy, Mr. Landon, and Mr. Taft about the ori-
gins of the Landon speech.
162. Mr. Landon's basic opposition to an insurance and non-income-tested
program is evidenced in a statement he made to the author.
In a nutshell, we find the way Social Security and Medicare have been
written and administered, they are a bonanza for the people not in
need and those really in need are increasingly pinched as the result.
Even more are the widespread ramifications of the tragic family disso-
lution under the Social Security Act that are contributing to dreadful
tensions in our country. I have always been concerned that sincere
dedicated advocates of both programs like you have not seen the hu-
manitarian need for sweeping reform.
Letter from Alf M. Landon to Wilbur J. Cohen (Oct. 15, 1970).
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the American way of life, ready to be broadened and expanded
by a series of incremental changes over nearly fifty years.163
Subsequent to the 1936 election, Senator Arthur Vanden-
berg, a Republican from Michigan who strongly favored a pay-
as-you-go financing plan but was not committed on any specific
method of determining the benefits or the taxes, suggested the
establishment of an advisory council to reexamine the social
security program. Arthur J. Altmeyer, by then chairperson of
the Social Security Board, wisely accepted the invitation; he
and Vandenberg jointly selected the membership. The Advi-
sory Council recommendations revised the program's financing
toward a pay-as-you-go program, added survivors insurance
benefits, started paying benefits in 1940 instead of 1942, and be-
gan the process of incrementally improving the Act.164 Landon,
the Republicans, and Vandenberg thus became the inadvertent
instruments of the incremental expansionist development of
the program through their strong support of pay-as-you-go
financing.165
VI. CONCLUSION
The Social Security Act of 1935 was in one sense a "quan-
tum leap" in social policy but in another sense also an incre-
mental development in social policy evolution. Under
President Roosevelt's leadership the Act broke with the past
policy advanced by President Pierce, and supported by Presi-
dent Hoover, in vastly expanding public responsibility for deal-
ing with the problems of old age, unemployment, disability, and
childhood dependency. Yet, it carried this policy out in a way
that built upon well-accepted institutional practices: it utilized
the widely understood pooling-of-the-risk concept prevalent in
private insurance (in connection with old age and unemploy-
ment compensation) and federal-state cooperation (in connec-
tion with unemployment insurance, welfare, rehabilitation,
public health, child health, and social services).
The Act was thus an expression of the ability of Roosevelt's
163. I have no doubt, from my association with the staff in 1934-35 and sub-
sequent discussions, that if the Committee had not been established there
would not have been an old age insurance program. The three persons primar-
ily responsible for the old age insurance proposal were: J. Douglas Brown of
Princeton University, Murray W. Latimer of Industrial Relations Counselors,
and Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong.
164. S. Doc. No. 4, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
165. Landon's Milwaukee speech also criticized the unemployment compen-
sation provisions of the 1935 Act, but these provisions did not become a polit-
ical issue in 1935-38.
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advisors to combine both a radical and a conservative program
in one legislative package. The Act has served as a mechanism,
over the past several decades, to stimulate the increases in
both public and private expenditures for social security, health,
welfare, and social services that have become a built-in stabi-
lizer of consumer buying power, permitting the continued func-
tioning of the market-price-profit system in a work-oriented
free enterprise economy.
Roosevelt was very concerned about the possible political
change or repeal of the old age insurance program in the fu-
ture. Thus, he supported and justified the use of contributory
payroll taxes to finance the insurance programs as "the"
method that would assure continuation and support of a statu-
tory and political "right" of individuals to receive benefits with-
out an income or "needs" test in time of financial constraints.
At the time he signed the Social Security Act into law,
President Roosevelt explained his basic incremental approach
when he said that the Social Security Act "represents a corner
stone in a structure which is being built but is by no means
complete." The building of the program has been a continuing
process which Roosevelt expected to go on until the program
provided protection against all the major hazards of life "from
the cradle to the grave."
It is obvious as one looks about the world that there is no
one best or simple way to provide social security. Each country
does it in a way related to its historical background, resources,
psychology, interested groups, priorities, and biases. There
may be better ways to achieve social security than through the
mechanisms incorporated in the present law, but especially in
the United States there must be accommodations to differing
viewpoints and conditions. Just as there are ways to form a
more perfect union in marriage and in merchandising, better
ways to raise children and canteloupes, and better ways to im-
prove family life and the automobile, so it is with social secur-
ity. John Winnant, the first chairperson of the Social Security
Board, once said to me that it is essential to be unsatisfied but
not to be dissatisfied with the social policy process involved in
social change.
Nevertheless, the 1935 Act represents a significant and in-
novative step which created a workable institutional network
which has survived nine presidents from both political parties
and twenty-five Congresses. There is no current evidence, de-
spite harsh criticisms and many proposed alternatives, that the
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Congress intends to change the basic structure, fundamental
philosophy, or financing arrangements of the social insurance
features of the 1935 Act. Although the provisions of the Social
Security Act undoubtedly will change in the future, as it has in
the past,166 it will remain, in my opinion, a dynamic and influ-
ential factor in American economic, social, and political life.
166. The Social Security Act was amended in important respects in 1939,
1946, 1948, 1950, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1958, 1961, 1965, 1968, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1982,
and 1983. Minor amendments were enacted in several other years. For an in-
terpretation of the way in which the United States' program evolved, see M.
DERTHICK, POLCYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURrrY (1979).
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